Darned if You Due Process, Darned if You Don\u27t! Understanding the Due Process Dilemma for Punitive Damages in Title VII Class Actions by Harold, Paul Edgar & Cole, Tracy L.
University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review 
Volume 30 Issue 3 Article 2 
2008 
Darned if You Due Process, Darned if You Don't! Understanding 
the Due Process Dilemma for Punitive Damages in Title VII Class 
Actions 
Paul Edgar Harold 
Tracy L. Cole 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the 
Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Paul Edgar Harold and Tracy L. Cole, Darned if You Due Process, Darned if You Don't! Understanding the 
Due Process Dilemma for Punitive Damages in Title VII Class Actions, 30 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 453 
(2008). 
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss3/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review by an authorized editor of Bowen 
Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu. 
DARNED IF YOU DUE PROCESS, DARNED IF YOU DON'T!
UNDERSTANDING THE DUE PROCESS DILEMMA FOR PUNITIVE
DAMAGES IN TITLE VII CLASS ACTIONS
Paul Edgar Harold* & Tracy L. Cole-
I. INTRODUCTION
Almost immediately after Title VII was passed, courts and litigants
alike recognized that employment discrimination cases were uniquely suited
for adjudication as class actions.' Because "suits alleging racial or ethnic
discrimination are often by their nature class suits, involving classwide
wrongs,"2 the class action became an important tool for resolving suits under
Title VII. Indeed, a Title VII pattern-and-practice suit was considered the
archetype for certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2),3
which allows a case to proceed as a class action where a defendant has
"acted or refused to act on grounds [generally applicable] to the class."
Despite this well-recognized congruence between Title VII cases and
the class action device, federal courts have recently begun to view employ-
ment discrimination cases and class actions as about as complementary as
oil and water, or the Yankees and Red Sox, or even snakes and airplanes.'
* Law clerk to the Honorable Daniel Manion, Circuit Judge, United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
** Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, Arkansas Tech University, and former law
clerk to the late Honorable Richard Sheppard Arnold, Circuit Judge, United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
1. Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination Class Actions Survive?, 37 AKRON L.
REv. 813, 813 (2004).
2. E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys. Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395,405 (1977).
3. Hart, supra note 1, at 813 n.2 and accompanying text. As the advisory committee
notes stated, "Illustrative [of a (b)(2) class] are various actions in the civil rights field where a
party is charged with discriminating unlawfully against a class ... " Id.
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
5. As goes the famous joke:
A Cubs fan, a Cardinals fan, a Yankees fan, and a Red Sox fan are climbing a
mountain and arguing about who loves their team the most.
The Cubs fan insists that he is the most loyal. He yells "This is for the Cubs" and
throws himself off the side of the mountain.
Not to be outdone, the Cardinals fan shouts, "This is for the Cardinals!" and
jumps off the side of the mountain.
The Red Sox fan is next to profess his love for his team. "This is for everyone!"
He yells and shoves the Yankees fan off the side of the mountain.
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The reason behind this about-face was the judicial reaction to the addition of
compensatory and punitive damages in the Title VII plaintiffs stable of
remedies. When Congress expanded the remedies available to Title VII
plaintiffs in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to include compensatory and puni-
tive damages,6 it did not realize that it was creating a minefield for certifying
would-be Title VII class actions.7 The Fifth Circuit thoroughly explored
Yankees fans, of course, always have this retort: "Did you hear the news about
Bill Buckner? He accidentally jumped in front of a bus. Luckily for him it went
between his legs."
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a provides:
(a) Right of recovery
(1) Civil Rights
In an action brought by a complaining party under section 706 or 717 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5 or 2000e-16] against a respondent
who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination . . . the complaining party
may recover compensatory and punitive damages as allowed in subsection (b) of
this section. .. from the respondent.
(b) Compensatory and punitive damages
(1) Determination of punitive damages
A complaining party may recover punitive damages under this section against a
respondent (other than a government, government agency or political subdivi-
sion) if the complaining party demonstrates that the respondent engaged in a dis-
criminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless in-
difference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.
(2) Exclusions from compensatory damages
Compensatory damages awarded under this section shall not include backpay, in-
terest on backpay, or any other type of relief authorized under section 706(g) of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)].
(3) Limitations
The sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded under this section for
future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental an-
guish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses, and the amount
of punitive damages awarded under this section, shall not exceed, for each com-
plaining party-
(A) in the case of a respondent who has more than 14 and fewer than 101 em-
ployees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calen-
dar year, $50,000;
(B) in the case of a respondent who has more than 100 and fewer than 201 em-
ployees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calen-
dar year, $100,000;
(C) in the case of a respondent who has more than 200 and fewer than 501 em-
ployees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calen-
dar year, $200,000; and
(D) in the case of a respondent who has more than 500 employees in each of 20
or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $300,000.
7. As one commentator has noted, "[T]here is no indication in the legislative history [of
the 1991 Act] that Congress considered the effect [that the authorization of punitive and
compensatory damages may] have on class litigation as opposed to individual claims." Daniel
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many of the new pitfalls and hazards in its landmark opinion in Allison v.
Citgo Petroleum Corp.8 Previously, Title VII plaintiffs had sought class
certification through Rule 23(b)(2), as was mentioned above. With the addi-
tion of monetary damages and the individualized issues preceding their cal-
culation, however, Title VII plaintiffs seeking class certification suddenly
found Rule 23(b)(2) to be an inhospitable host. The Fifth Circuit in Allison
held that, unless monetary damages flowed directly to the class as a whole
rather than requiring individualized damages determinations, the request for
monetary damages would preclude certification under Rule 23(b)(2).9 Many
commentators have argued that Allison signaled the death knell for Title VII
class actions.'"
The purpose of this article is not to add to the already abundant scho-
larship dissecting Allison." Rather, this article attempts to evaluate critically
a recent post-Allison trend whereby Title VII plaintiffs seeking class certifi-
cation have foregone their claims for compensatory damages while still
seeking punitive damages. Plaintiffs, relying on the Supreme Court's recent
cases concerning punitive damages-BMW of North America Inc. v. Gore,
2
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,3 and most re-
F. Piar, The Uncertain Future of Title VII Class Actions After the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
2001 BYU L. REv. 305, 307 (2001).
8. 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1998).
9. Id. at415.
10. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 1, at 814 ("The combination of [the Civil Rights Act of
1991] with shifting attitudes towards class action litigation more generally is casting serious
doubt in some minds on the continu[ing] viability of the employment discrimination class
action in federal court."); Gary M. Kramer, No Class: Post-1991 Barriers to Rule 23 Certifi-
cation of Across-the-Board Employment Discrimination Cases, 15 LAB. LAW. 415, 454-55
(2000); Scotty Shively, Resurgence of the Class Action Lawsuit in Employment Discrimina-
tion Cases: New Obstacles Presented by the 1991 Amendments to the Civil Rights Act, 23 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 925, 951 (2001) ("One can speculate as to the continuing viability
of class action lawsuits brought under federal employment discrimination statutes."); Harvey
S. Bartlett I1, Comment, Determining Whether a Title VII Plaintiff Class 's "Aim is True":
The Legacy of Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp. for Employment Discrimination Class Certi-
fication Under Rule 23(b)(2), 74 TUt. L. REv. 2163, 2188 (2000) ("The ultimate legacy [of
Allison] is that the deep social ill of discrimination will not be confronted in the courts with
the strength and effect intended by Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 .").
11. See, e.g., Jeffrey H. Dasteel & Ronda McKaig, What's Money Got to Do with It?:
How Subjective, Ad Hoc Standards for Permitting Money Damages in Rule 23(b)(2) Injunc-
tive Relief Classes Undermine Rule 23"s Analytical Framework, 80 TutL. L. REv. 1881 (2006);
Hart, supra note 1; Kramer, supra note 10; Piar, supra note 7; Shively, supra note 10; Bar-
tlett, supra note 10; Robert M. Brava-partain, Note, Due Process, Rule 23, and Hybrid
Classes: A Practical Solution, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1359 (2002); Lesley Frieder Wolf, Note,
Evading Friendly Fire: Achieving Class Certification After the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 100
COLUM. L. REv. 1847 (2000).
12. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
13. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
455
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cently, Philip Morris USA v. Williams'4-- argue that a classwide claim for
punitive damages brought in a mandatory Rule 23(b)(2) class provides the
best procedural mechanism for protecting a defendant's due process rights,
while at the same time assuring that each plaintiff gets his or her fair share
of the punitive damages pot. Although that argument is appealing, this ar-
ticle will show that the same cases relied on by Title VII plaintiffs-BMW,
State Farm, and Philip Morris-create due process problems that are nearly
insurmountable for any claim of classwide punitive damages.
Ultimately, the "due process dilemma" this article identifies is this: if a
Title VII plaintiff brings a claim for punitive damages in an individual suit,
he faces the specter of getting his punitive damages award remitted on due
process grounds. However, if he brings a classwide claim for punitive dam-
ages in order to avoid the due-process problems inherent with individual
suits for punitive damages, he faces new due-process objections. If the
plaintiff focuses on remedying the potential due process problems for class
members that attend aggregating punitive damages claims by letting class
members opt out, he risks trampling on the employer's due process rights
and subjecting the employer to duplicative punishment. However, if he fo-
cuses on solving the due process problems of the employer by keeping the
class mandatory and seeking redress through a class award of punitive dam-
ages, he risks running ramshod over his fellow class members' due process
rights and swamping the litigation in a morass of procedural unmanageabili-
ty.
A few observations about the scope of this Article need to be discussed
at the outset. First, this Article deals exclusively with Title VII suits sought
to be certified under Rule 23(b)(2). Although some Title VII plaintiffs have
sought certification of classwide claims for punitive damages under Rule
23(b)(3), 5 discussion of those instances are outside the scope of this Article.
The reason for the single-minded focus on Rule 23(b)(2) will become appar-
ent later.' 6 Second, this Article focuses exclusively on the due process con-
cerns with certifying a classwide claim for punitive damages. That means
other aspects of classwide claims for punitive damages that have troubled
14. 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007).
15. See, e.g., Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 419-20 (5th Cir. 1998).
Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for class certification where
"the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predo-
minate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is supe-
rior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." FED.
R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
16. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing why only a mandatory class avoids the due-process
problems identified in State Farm).
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courts, such as adequacy of representation, 7 res judicata, 18 and the Seventh
Amendment, 9 will not be discussed. This choice to focus exclusively on due
process does not mean that those concerns are of no import. To the contrary,
many of those other objections are just as weighty, if not of greater concern,
than the due process problems. Discussing every legal difficulty with certi-
fying classwide claims for punitive damages, however, would tax the capac-
ity of the humble authors of this Article and result in something more akin
to a treatise than an article; thus, the exclusive focus on due process.
The Article will proceed as follows. Part II explains how the trend
arose that Title VII plaintiffs were pushed toward class claims for punitive
damages. Part II also explains how the Supreme Court's punitive damages
jurisprudence influenced that trend. Part III outlines the cases where courts
have been faced with Title VII plaintiffs seeking class certification with
punitive damages as their only non-equitable claim for monetary damages.
Finally, Part IV explains the due process dilemma Title VII plaintiffs seek-
ing punitive damages and class certification face as a result of the Supreme
Court's decisions in BMW, State Farm, and Williams.
II. THE APPEAL OF CLASSWIDE PUNITIVE DAMAGES
This section analyzes the emerging trend whereby Title VII plaintiffs
have sought classwide punitive damages, but not compensatory damages.
There are two reasons for that trend. First, although the Fifth Circuit's opi-
nion in Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp. slammed the door closed on claims
for compensatory damages brought in a Title VII class action under Rule
23(b)(2), the Fifth Circuit appeared to leave open whether, given the right
facts, a class-wide claim for punitive damages could survive Rule 23(b)(2)
certification. Second, the Supreme Court's decisions in BMW v. Gore and
State Farm v. Campbell pushed plaintiffs towards the mandatory class ac-
tion as a way to avoid the due process problems that led to the plaintiffs in
BMW and State Farm having their awards of punitive damages overturned.
A. Compensatory Damages Foreclosed
Class suits are group suits. 20 In a Rule 23(b)(2) class action, the group
nature of class actions is especially apparent. Certification under Rule
17. See, e.g., Thompson v. Am. Tobacco Co., Inc., 189 F.R.D. 544, 550-51 (D. Minn.
1999); Zachary v. Texaco Exploration & Prod., Inc., 185 F.R.D. 230, 243 (W.D. Tex. 1999);
Feinstein v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 535 F. Supp. 595, 606-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
18. See, e.g., Coleman v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 220 F.R.D. 64, 80-81 (M.D.
Tenn. 2004).
19. See, e.g., Allison, 151 F.3d at 422-24.
20. Hart, supra note 1, at 821.
UALR LAW REVIEW
23(b)(2) is appropriate if "the party opposing the class has acted or refused
to act on grounds that [are] generally [applicable] to the class, making ap-
propriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with re-
spect to the class as a whole."'" Whereas a court in a Rule 23(b)(3) class
action has to deal with the possibility of divergence of interest among class
members due to differing-valued monetary claims,22 the "very nature of a
(b)(2) class" is homogeneity "without any conflicting interests between the
members of the class."23 A court facing a Rule 23(b)(2) class need not worry
that some class members who have suffered greater harm than the rest will
get short-changed by the bringing of a collective action, or conversely that
those class members who were not harmed at all will still gain recovery,
because uniformity in harm and remedy is the very nature of injunctive and
declaratory relief. Because of the homogeneity of interest, Rule 23(b)(2)
classes are mandatory-that is they do not give any class member the oppor-
tunity to opt out24 -and binding on all class members."
The injection of compensatory damages and punitive damages into
Title VII litigation, however, caused courts to fear that the homogeneity of a
class certified under (b)(2) would be lost. Because monetary relief opens up
the possibility of divergent interests,26 courts have rigorously scrutinized any
monetary relief requested by a Title VII plaintiff seeking class certification
in order to protect individual interests and ensure that the underlying as-
sumption of homogeneity is not undermined. The result of that scrutiny was
the near-unanimous exclusion of claims for compensatory damages from
Title VII class action litigation. The Fifth Circuit's decision in Allison is, to
date, the most thorough explanation of why courts have rejected certification
under Rule 23(b)(2) for proposed Title VII classes that include claims for
compensatory damages.
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
22. Classes certified under Rule 23(b)(3) are required to provide the procedural protec-
tions of notice and the opportunity to opt out precisely because of the possibility of divergent
interests. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) advisory committee's note.
23. Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239,256 (3d Cir. 1975).
24. Linda S. Mullenix, No Exit: Mandatory Class Actions in the New Millenium and the
Blurring of Categorical Imperatives, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 177, 183 (2003).
25. Some courts have blurred the lines between Rule 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) by certifying
classes for claims of punitive damages under Rule 23(b)(2), yet giving the class members the
opportunity to opt out as though the class were certified under 23(b)(3). See Part III.A.
26. Indeed, the Supreme Court has questioned in dicta whether monetary damages can
ever be recovered in a Rule 23(b)(2) class action for precisely this reason, stating that there
was at least a "substantial possibility" that monetary damages are altogether impermissible in
(b)(2) classes. Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117, 121 (1994). The Supreme Court
has never addressed this question square-on, though, for good reason. Holding that no mone-
tary relief could be recovered in a (b)(2) class flies in the face of long-established circuit
court precedent. Piar, supra note 7, at 319 (noting that "the availability of equitable monetary
remedies" in Rule 23(b)(2) class actions is "entrenched as a matter of precedent").
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Allison involved a challenge to Citgo's employment practices with re-
gard to hiring, promotion, training, compensation, and harassment at its
manufacturing facility in Lake Charles, Louisiana.2 ' The plaintiffs sought
certification under Rule 23(b)(2) as well as punitive and compensatory dam-
ages.28 In affirming the denial of certification, the Fifth Circuit explained
why it believed those two monetary remedies stymied certification under
Rule 23(b)(2). According to the Fifth Circuit:
The underlying premise of the (b)(2) class-that its members suffer from
a common injury properly addressed by class-wide relief-begins to
break down when the class seeks to recover ... monetary relief to be al-
located based on individual injuries. [A]s claims for individually based
money damages begin to predominate, the presumption of cohesiveness
decreases while the need for enhanced procedural safeguards to protect
the individual rights of class members increases, thereby making class
certification under (b)(2) less appropriate.
We know, then, that monetary relief "predominates" under Rule 23(b)(2)
when its presence in the litigation suggests that the procedural safe-
guards of notice and opt-out are necessary, that is, when the monetary re-
lief being sought is less of a group remedy and instead depends more on
the varying circumstances and merits of each potential class member's
case.
29
The court in Allison then held that, where damages did not flow direct-
ly from liability to the class as a whole on the claims forming the basis of
the injunctive or declaratory relief, monetary damages predominated and the
class could not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2).3° The Fifth Circuit spelled
out what it meant by "flowing to a class as a whole":
[T]he recovery of incidental damages [i.e. damages that flow directly
from liability to the class as a whole] should typically be concomitant
with, not merely consequential to, class-wide injunctive or declaratory
relief. Moreover, such damages should at least be capable of computa-
tion by means of objective standards and not dependent in any signifi-
cant way on the intangible, subjective differences of each class mem-
ber's circumstances. Liability for incidental damages should not require
additional hearings to resolve the disparate merits of each individual's
case; it should neither introduce new and substantial legal or factual is-
sues, nor entail complex individualized determinations. Thus, incidental
27. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp, 151 F.3d 402, 407 (5th Cir. 1998).
28. Id. at 407.
29. Allison, 151 F.3d at 413 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
30. Id. at 415.
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damages will, by definition, be more in the nature of a group remedy,
consistent with the forms of relief intended for (b)(2) class actions.
31
Applying those principles to the claims for compensatory damages and
punitive damages before the court, the Fifth Circuit in Allison held that the
inclusion of both precluded certification under Rule 23(b)(2). The court
found compensatory damages to be an "individual, not class-wide" remedy
because the "very nature of' compensatory damages required "individua-
lized proof of discrimination and actual injury to each class member.
32
The Fifth Circuit's fmding that compensatory damages claims could
not be squared with Rule 23(b)(2) has proved to be the death knell of claims
for compensatory damages in employment discrimination class actions, ex-
cept in rare cases-like when a specific damages award is statutorily man-
dated or otherwise immediately apparent.33 Although not all courts have
followed Allison-and most notably the Second34 and Ninth Circuits35 have
not-the Fifth Circuit's reasoning has been followed by an ever-increasing
number of jurisdictions.36 Furthermore, the alternatives to Allison's categori-
cal approach to monetary damages provided by the courts rejecting Allison
leave much to be desired in the way of providing legal clarity.37 Thus,
whether the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Allison was right or wrong, Title VII
plaintiffs have seen the handwriting on the wall: plaintiffs should not bring
claims for compensatory damages if they want their class action to be certi-
fied in most jurisdictions.
But what about punitive damages? Although the Fifth Circuit in Allison
upheld the district court's finding that the plaintiffs' class claim for punitive
damages was inconsistent with Rule 23(b)(2) as well, some language in the
Allison decision appeared to leave the door open for class-wide claims for
punitive damages in Title VII class actions. The court in Allison began its
discussion by assuming that class-wide claims for punitive damages could
31. Id.
32. Id. at 417.
33. Allison cited approvingly Arnold v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 158 F.R.D.
439 (N.D. Cal. 1994), in which the defendant's liability entitled the class to a statutorily-
mandated damages award. Allison, 151 F.3d at 415.
34. Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 164 (2d Cir. 2001).
35. Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 950 (9th Cir. 2003).
36. See Barabin v. Aramark Corp., No. 02-8057, 2003 WL 355417, at *1-2 (3d Cir. Jan.
24, 2003); Coleman v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 296 F.3d 443, 448 (6th Cir. 2002);
Murray v. Auslander, 244 F.3d 807, 812 (11th Cir. 2001); Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int'l Inc.,
195 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Nelson v. Wal-Mart, No. 2:04CV171, slip op. at
28-29 (E.D. Ark. May 16, 2007).
37. See, e.g., Robinson, 267 F.3d at 164 (applying an ad hoc balancing determination to
determine whether claims for compensatory damages can be brought in a class seeking certi-
fication under Rule 23(b)(2)). The effectively standardless approach of the Second Circuit to
this issue has been rightfully criticized. See, e.g., Dasteel & McKaig, supra note 11.
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be brought without individualized proof of injury" where the entire class is
"subjected to the same discriminatory act or series of acts."39 The Fifth Cir-
cuit found, however, that "no such discrimination is alleged in this case":'
The plaintiffs challenge broad policies and practices, but they do not
contend that each plaintiff was affected by these policies and practices in
the same way. Indeed, the plaintiffs seek to certify a class of a thousand
potential plaintiffs spread across two separate facilities, represented by
six different unions, working in seven different departments, challenging
various policies and practices over a period of nearly twenty years. Some
plaintiffs may have been subjected to more virile discrimination than
others: with greater public humiliation, for longer periods of time, or
based on more unjustifiable practices, for example .... Some discrimi-
natory policies may have been implemented more-or less-harshly de-
pending on the department or facility involved.4'
Those factual differences demonstrated that, given the particular facts
in Allison, the potential class members in Allison would have to put on indi-
vidualized proof for punitive damages. Even though the facts of Allison
were not appropriate for a class-wide claim for punitive damages, the Fifth
Circuit appeared to leave the door open for class-wide claims for punitive
damages if plaintiffs alleged that each class member was affected by the
employer's discriminatory policies and practices "in the same way." Thus,
Title VII plaintiffs, after reading Allison, could conclude-not altogether
unreasonably-that, given the right facts, a class-wide claim for punitive
damages could survive Rule 23(b)(2) certification.
Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit was not as dismissive of the notion of
bringing a class-wide claim for punitive damages in a Rule 23(b)(2) Title
VII class action as it was to claims for compensatory damages. The court in
Allison indicated that class-wide claims for punitive damages would not
necessarily have a rosy future in Title VII litigation, either. Title VII class
actions typically have two stages. The first stage establishes whether the
defendant employer has engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) makes punitive damages available if an employer acted
with malice or reckless indifference to rights of an "aggrieved individual." Some courts, like
Allison, have wondered whether the "aggrieved individual" language in the statute forecloses
class-wide claims for punitive damages. See, e.g., Allison, 151 F.3d at 417. Whether or not
the plain language of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 prohibits class-wide punitive damages
claim is another matter beyond the ken of this Article. It suffices to say that no court has
expressly so held. And the Ninth Circuit rejected that argument in Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 474
F.3d 1214, 1241 (9th Cir. 2007).




entitling the group to injunctive relief.42 The second stage establishes the
defendant's actual liability to individual class members and those class
members' entitlement to monetary damages such as back pay.43 The Fifth
Circuit stated in dicta that it believed punitive damages could only be de-
termined after the second stage of the litigation because the Supreme
Court's punitive damages jurisprudence required the amount of punitive
damages to be reasonably related to the compensatory damages awarded to
the plaintiff.' If the Fifth Circuit was correct in its reading of Supreme
Court caselaw, then the same individualized determinations required for
determining compensatory damages would also be required for determining
punitive damages, making class-wide claims for punitive damages just as
much of an impossibility as claims for compensatory damages.
B. Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Due Process and Punitive Damages
Appeared to Encourage Classwide Award
At the same time as Title VII plaintiffs were watching courts close the
door to claims for compensatory damages in Rule 23(b)(2) classes, their
lawyers were reading the Supreme Court's case law on punitive damages in
a very different manner than the Fifth Circuit in Allison. Although all the
Supreme Court cases substantively limiting punitive damages involved state
punitive damages awards and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause, federal courts have not hesitated to apply the principles of those
cases to punitive damages awarded under federal law.45 To plaintiffs, the
Supreme Court's decisions in the area of due process and punitive damages
appeared to be implicitly egging on class-action claims for punitive damag-
es. Unfortunately for plaintiffs, however, the new constitutional rules
adopted by the Supreme Court were not as hospitable to class treatment of
punitive damages as they seemed.
1. BMW v. Gore
The first case to set substantive limits on punitive damages was BMW
v. Gore. 6 In BMW, an Alabama jury imposed a $4 million punitive damages
award against BMW for its failure to disclose to Dr. Ira Gore, Jr., that his
42. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 360-61 (1977).
43. See id. at 361.
44. Allison, 151 F.3d at 417.
45. See, e.g., Pollard v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours, Inc., 412 F.3d 657 (6th Cir. 2005);
Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 817 (9th Cir. 2001). Cases like Pollard and Swin-
ton are presumably applying the substantive dimensions of the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause.
46. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
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car had been repainted prior to its sale. 7 At trial, BMW had not disputed
that it had adopted a nationwide policy of not informing consumers about
repairs performed on new cars that did not exceed three percent of the retail
price, and that Dr. Gore's car had been sold without disclosing the new paint
job pursuant to that policy.4 The Alabama Supreme Court reduced the jury
award to $2 million, holding that the jury had improperly computed the
amount of punitive damages by factoring in BMW's conduct pursuant to its
nationwide policy that had occurred in other states.49
The United States Supreme Court, per Justice Stevens, found that the
Alabama Supreme Court was correct in reducing Dr. Gore's punitive dam-
ages award for having taken into account conduct that occurred in other
states. According to the Court, principles of "state sovereignty and comity"
dictated that BMW could not be punished for conduct that had no impact on
Alabama or its residents." As for the rest of Dr. Gore's $2 million award,
the Court stated that punitive damages could be "properly imposed to further
a state's legitimate interest in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its
repetition."'" The Court held, however, that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment was implicated by a state award of punitive damag-
es when the award was "grossly excessive" in relation to the state's legiti-
mate interests of punishment and deterrence. 2 According to the Court,
"[e]lementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurispru-
dence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that
will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a
State may impose."53
Justice Stevens then laid out three guideposts to determine whether an
award of punitive damages was "grossly excessive": (1) the degree of repre-
hensibility of the defendant's conduct; (2) the disparity between the harm or
potential harm54 suffered by the plaintiff and his punitive damages award;
and (3) the difference between the punitive damages award and the civil
penalties authorized by law.55 The first two guideposts are the most impor-
47. Id. at 564-65.
48. Id. at 563-64.
49. Id. at 567.
50. Id. at 572.
51. Id. at 568.
52. BMW, 517 U.S. at 568.
53. Id. at 574.
54. The Supreme Court was emphatic in Philip Morris USA v. Williams that "potential
harm" meant only potential harm to the plaintiff: "We have said that it may be appropriate to
consider the reasonableness of a punitive damages award in light of the potential harm the
defendant's conduct could have caused. But we have made clear that the potential harm at
issue was harm potentially caused the plaintiff." 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1063 (2007) (emphasis in
original).
55. BMW, 517 U.S. at 575-83.
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tant for purposes of this article. With regard to reprehensibility, the Court
found that BMW's conduct was not particularly egregious given that the
damages were purely economic.56 Although the Court recognized that a de-
fendant who "has repeatedly engaged in prohibited conduct while knowing
or suspecting that it was unlawful" would be deserving of a stiffer award of
punitive damages, the Court did not find any such pattern in the case before
it.
57
The Court then turned to the disparity between punitive damages and
the actual harm suffered by the plaintiff. 58 Although the Court declined to
set any definite ratio between punitive damages and the harm inflicted, the
Court emphasized that the amount of punitive damages Dr. Gore received
was 500 times $4000, the amount of Dr. Gore's compensatory damages-
which the Court characterized as his actual harm-as determined by the
jury.59 The Court also noted that the punitive damages award was thirty-five
times greater than the total damages of all fourteen Alabama consumers who
purchased repainted BMWs. 60 The Supreme Court held that the $2 million
award of punitive damages was constitutionally excessive and remanded the
case to the Alabama Supreme Court.
6'
Commentators at once realized that BMW opened the door for unprece-
dented scrutiny of punitive damages awards. BMW's effect on class claims
for punitive damages, however, was not as immediately apparent. Neverthe-
less, BMW laid the groundwork for a massive rethinking of the relationship
between punitive damages and Title VII class actions. Although relying on a
federalism and not a due-process rationale, the Supreme Court approved of
the Alabama Supreme Court's reduction of the punitive damages award for
taking into account out-of-state conduct. The reduction of Dr. Gore's award
in BMtW for punishing BMW for its actions against out-of-state customers
was the first step along the way to holding that a court could not assess puni-
tive damages for harm done to persons not before the court. The principle
that a court could not punish for harm to persons not before the court, in
turn, pushed plaintiffs towards the use of the class action, as will be ex-
plained in more detail below. Furthermore, the Supreme Court's anchoring
in BMW of the maximum punitive damages award that was constitutionally
permissible to the amount of harm the individual plaintiff suffered is of
great significance. It is the establishment of the relationship between the
56. Id. at 576.
57. Id. at 576-77.
58. The Court explained that what it meant by "potential harm" was "the harm to the
victim that would have ensued if the [defendant's] tortious plan had succeeded." Id. at 581.
59. Id. at 582.
60. Id. at 582 n.35.
61. BMW,517U.S.at586.
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harm done and the punitive damages recoverable that ultimately would be
the undoing of classwide claims for punitive damages in Title VII cases.
2. State Farm v. Campbell
It was not until the Supreme Court's decision in State Farm Mutual Au-
tomobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell62 that the implications of the Supreme
Court's punitive damages jurisprudence on Title VII class actions began to
be realized. In State Farm, the Supreme Court held that a $145 million puni-
tive damages award was excessive where the plaintiffs had received a com-
pensatory award of $1 million. 63 The Campbells sued State Farm, their au-
tomobile liability insurer, for State Farm's role in litigation arising from an
automobile accident Campbell had caused when he tried to pass six vans
traveling ahead of him on a two-lane highway.' The crash killed one motor-
ist and maimed another.65 Although the consensus was that Campbell was at
fault, State Farm, in defending Campbell in the tort suit arising from the
accident, contested liability and declined to settle the claims for the policy
limit of $50,000.66 State Farm took the case to trial and assured the Camp-
bells that "their assets were safe, that they had no liability for the accident,
that [State Farm] would represent their interests, and that they did not need
to procure separate counsel., 67 When the jury returned a verdict far in excess
of the policy limit, State Farm refused to cover the excess, telling the Camp-
bells: "You may want to put for sale signs on your property to get things
moving.
' 61
The Campbells then brought a bad faith claim against State Farm.69 At
trial, the Campbells introduced evidence that State Farm's decision to take
the case to trial was the result of the application of a nationwide "Perfor-
mance, Planning and Review" policy that attempted "to deny benefits owed
consumers by paying out less than fair value in order to meet preset, arbi-
trary payout targets designed to enhance corporate profits., 70 Based on the
evidence that the Campbells presented concerning State Farm's nationwide
policy, the jury awarded the Campbells $2.6 million in compensatory dam-
62. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
63. Id. at 429.
64. Id. at 412.
65. Id. at413.
66. Id.
67. Id. (quoting Campbell v. State Farm, 65 P.3d 1134, 1142 (2001)).
68. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 413 (quoting Campbell v. State Farm, 65 P.3d 1134, 1142
(2001)).
69. Id. at 413-14.
70. Id. at 415, 431-32 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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ages-which the trial court reduced to $1 million-and $145 million in pu-
nitive damages.7
The Court in State Farm began by restating that, although punitive
damages may be imposed validly to punish and deter, "[t]he Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit[ed] the imposition of 'grossly
excessive' or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor. 72 The Court noted that
"defendants subjected to punitive damages in civil cases have not been ac-
corded the protections applicable to a criminal proceeding" and that punitive
damages therefore posed "an acute danger of arbitrary deprivation" of the
defendant's property.73 According to the Court, the dangers are especially
present when "evidence that has little bearing as to the amount of punitive
damages that should be awarded" is presented. 74 The Supreme Court found
that was the case in State Farm because the punitive damages awarded were
based more on exposing and punishing the perceived deficiencies of State
Farm's operations throughout the country than State Farm's conduct to-
wards the Campbells.75
Turning to the reprehensibility guidepost, the Court gave two reasons
why the introduction of evidence of State Farm's actions beyond what State
Farm did to the Campbells was problematic:
Lawful out-of-state conduct may be probative when it demonstrates the
deliberateness and culpability of the defendant's action in the State
where it is tortious, but that conduct must have a nexus to the specific
harm suffered by the plaintiff. A jury must be instructed, furthermore,
that it may not use evidence of out-of-state conduct to punish a defendant
for action that was lawful in the jurisdiction where it occurred. A basic
principle of federalism is that each State may make its own reasoned
judgment about what conduct is permitted or prescribed within its bor-
ders ....
For a more fundamental reason, however, the Utah courts erred in rely-
ing upon this and other evidence: The courts awarded punitive damages
to punish and deter conduct that bore no relation to the Campbells' harm.
A defendant's dissimilar acts, independent from the acts upon which lia-
bility was premised, may not serve as the basis for punitive damages. A
defendant should be punished for the conduct that harmed the plaintiff,
not for being an unsavory individual or business. Due process does not
permit courts, in the calculation of punitive damages, to adjudicate the
merits of other parties' hypothetical claims against a defendant under the
71. Id. at415.
72. Id. at 416.
73. Id. at 417 (quoting Honda Motor Cor., Ltd v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432 (2003)).
74. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 418.
75. ld. at 420.
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guise of the reprehensibility analysis, but we have no doubt the Utah Su-
preme Court did that here.76
Although the Court in State Farm, as in BMW, was concerned with the
effect on state sovereignty and comity if a state was allowed to punish a
defendant for conduct committed out-of-state, the Court was clear that fede-
ralism was not the only concern.77 Rather, the Court was worried about un-
mooring the award of punitive damages from the harm to the plaintiff.78 The
Court also worried about "the possibility of multiple punitive damages
awards for the same conduct" because "nonparties are not [usually] bound
by the judgment some other plaintiff obtains."79 This double-counting ratio-
nale is a due process concern not previously articulated in the opinion of the
Court in BMW, although Justice Breyer did mention it in his concurrence in
that case.8" The Court did reiterate its BMW dicta that "a recidivist may be
punished more severely than a first offender" and that evidence of similar
acts committed by the defendant are relevant in assessing the reprehensibili-
ty of the defendant's acts to the plaintiff before the court.8' However-
despite evidence that State Farm's actions towards the Campbells were tak-
en in conformity with a nationwide policy-the Court found "scant evidence
of repeated misconduct of the sort" that injured the Campbells.82 The Court,
therefore, held that the conduct that harmed the Campbells was "the only
conduct relevant to the reprehensibility analysis."83
Turning to the ratio between the harm to the plaintiff and the punitive
damages award, the Court rejected all of the Campbells' arguments justify-
ing the 145 to 1 ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages. 84 In
doing so, the Court stressed that the precise award of punitive damages that
comports with due process depends upon the "facts and circumstances of the
defendant's conduct and the harm to the plaintiff., 85 A detailed investigation
of the nature of the harm was necessary, according to the Court, to deter-
mine the proper ratio between punitive damages and the harm to the plain-
tiff.6 The Court stated that such an investigation needed to include deter-
76. Id. at421-23.
77. Id. at 422-23.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 423.
80. BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 593 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring) ("Larger damages
might also 'double count' by including in the punitive damages award some of the compensa-
tory, or punitive, damages that subsequent plaintiffs would also recover.").
81. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 423 (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 577).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 424.
84. Id. at 425-29.
85. Id. at 425.
86. Id. at 426.
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mining whether the harm was economic or physical as well as whether the
punitive damages were awarded for a reason already covered by the award
of compensatory damages.87 The Court noted that the Campbells' punitive
damages award was based in large part on the outrage and humiliation suf-
fered by the Campbells, an element the Court claimed was already covered
by the compensatory damages awarded for emotional distress.8 s
Plaintiffs' lawyers intent on bringing Title VII class actions absorbed
one of the teachings of State Farm and ignored another. They rightly un-
derstood the Court's deployment of a due process, duplicative-punishment
rationale to justify the exclusion of State Farm's conduct towards non-
plaintiffs from the punitive damages equation as a harbinger of things to
come.89 They realized that in situations in which the defendant employer
harmed a group of employees,9" plaintiffs will always be subject to the spec-
ter of having any award of punitive damages remitted unless they joined all
those who were harmed in one action. The employer would argue that it
would be subject to duplicative punishment and over-deterrence unless the
award of punitive damages was reduced. Moreover, in cases in which the
plaintiff was harmed by an unlawful employment policy-as would be the
case in most pattern and practice class actions-the employer would argue
that introducing any evidence of others hurt by that policy for purposes of
punitive damages would be impermissibly litigating the claims for punitive
damages against the employer of other prospective plaintiffs. Thus, although
the Supreme Court claimed that the employer's repeated actions would be
factored into the reprehensibility analysis, in reality a plaintiff was going to
be limited to obtaining punishment only for the harm the employer caused
that plaintiff.
Plaintiffs saw the class-action device as a way around those problems.
If a Title VII plaintiff sought the certification of a mandatory class, then the
defendant could not object on the grounds that he may be punished twice. A
defendant also could not object that the plaintiff was impermissibly litigat-
ing the cases of other potential plaintiffs, because all of the potential plain-
tiffs would be participating in the action. For the strategy to work, of course,
87. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 426.
88. Id Emotional distress, of course, is a key component of compensatory damages
recoverable under Title VII.
89. The Supreme Court would later validate plaintiffs' interpretations of its prior prece-
dents when in Philip Morris USA v. Williams, discussed in the next subsection, it held due
process forbids punishing a defendant for injury inflicted on strangers to the litigation. See
infra Part II.B.3.
90. Employment discrimination, by its nature, easily becomes an offense against a class.
See Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982) ("We cannot disagree with the
proposition underlying the across-the-board rule[-]that racial discrimination is by definition
class discrimination."). Many instances of employment discrimination have involved harm
inflicted against a group of employees.
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the class would have to be certified under Rule 23(b)(2). Only a mandatory
class removes the due process objection; once class members begin to opt
out, the plaintiffs again open themselves up to the same double-counting
argument.
Plaintiffs were not the only ones to see the class action as the potential
remedy for the due process problems identified in State Farm. The Eighth
Circuit's opinion in Williams v. ConAgra Poultry Co.9 is one example of
some judicial thinking along these lines. In Williams, the Eight Circuit re-
mitted an award of punitive damages to an individual Title VII plaintiff that
was based, in part, on proof of the defendant's discriminatory conduct to-
wards other employees.92 In doing so, the court in Williams noted:
In assessing reprehensibility . . . it is crucial that a court focus on the
conduct related to the plaintiffs claim rather than the conduct of the de-
fendant in general. In [State Farm], the Supreme Court emphasized that
courts cannot award punitive damages to plaintiffs for wrongful behavior
that they did not themselves suffer. Tying punitive damages to the harm
actually suffered by the plaintiff prevents punishing defendants repeated-
ly for the same conduct: If a jury fails to confine its deliberations with
respect to punitive damages to the specific harm suffered by the plaintiff
and instead focuses on the conduct of the defendant in general, it may
award exemplary damages for conduct that could be the subject of an in-
dependent lawsuit, resulting in a duplicative punitive damages award.
93
The Court finished by observing that
where there has been a pattern of illegal conduct resulting in harm to a
large group of people, our system has mechanisms such as class action
suits for punishing defendants. 94 Punishing systematic abuses by a puni-
tive damages award in a case brought by an individual plaintiff, howev-
er, deprives the defendant of the safeguards against duplicative punish-
ment that inhere in the class action procedure.
95
As the Williams opinion demonstrates, plaintiffs' conclusions about the
usefulness of the class action device to eliminate some of the due process
concerns raised in State Farm were sound. Unfortunately, in drawing the
above lessons, the plaintiffs downplayed the significance of the Supreme
Court's tying of the punitive damages awardable to the level of individua-
lized harm. Although paying lip service to the societal function of punitive
91. 378 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 2004).
92. Id. at 797-98. The Court found a great deal of misconduct "insufficiently similar" to
that which harmed the plaintiff to count as evidence of recidivism under the reprehensibility
guidepost. Id. at 797.
93. Id. at 797.
94. Id. (emphasis added).
95. Id.
UALR LAW REVIEW
damages in punishing wrongdoers and deterring future misconduct, BMW
and State Farm demonstrated that the Supreme Court in fact viewed puni-
tive damages as simply another individualized damages claim-an exten-
sion of compensatory damages awardable when "the defendant does some-
thing really bad." The Court's focus in BMW and State Farm on the harm to
the individual plaintiff as the channel marker for what amount of punitive
damages was constitutionally permissible-as well as the Supreme Court's
statement in State Farm that any element of the punitive damages award
attributable to an element of compensatory damages was not justifiable and
the Supreme Court's limiting evidence of the defendant's misconduct to-
wards other employees to that which was substantially similar to the mis-
conduct that harmed the plaintiff-betrayed such an understanding. Thus,
although aggregating punitive damages claims in a class action would re-
move some due process objections, especially with regard to due process as
to the defendant, it would add others, this time centered on the plaintiffs.
Due to the individualized nature of the punitive damages inquiry, as set forth
by the Supreme Court, defendants in the class setting could argue that absent
class members were stuck holding the due-process bag, because their indivi-
dualized claims for punitive damages might be much better than most of the
other class members' claims. Yet, because their claims were lumped in with
everyone else's, they might not get their fair share. Defendants could also
argue that the use of a class action to bring a punitive damages claim fails on
procedural grounds because of the individualized nature of a punitive dam-
ages claim. As we will see in later sections, this is precisely what the defen-
dants did.
3. Philip Morris USA v. Williams
Although decided relatively recently, and thus not yet fully digested,
the holding of Philip Morris USA v. Williams 96 further illustrates the prin-
ciple that punitive damages are an individualized, rather than a collective,
remedy. In Philip Morris, the state trial court instructed the jury that
"[p]unitive damages are awarded against a defendant to punish misconduct
and to deter misconduct" and "are not intended to compensate the plaintiff
or anyone else for damages caused by the defendant's conduct." 97 The trial
court rejected Philip Morris's proposed instruction, which stated that "you
may consider the extent of harm suffered by others in determining what
[the] reasonable relationship is" between any punitive award and "the harm
caused to Jesse Williams" by Philip Morris's misconduct, "[but] you are not
to punish the defendant for the impact of its alleged misconduct on other
96. 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007).
97. Id. at 1061.
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persons, who may bring lawsuits of their own in which other juries can re-
solve their claims. 98 The Oregon Supreme Court, in affirming the trial
court's decision, rejected Philip Morris's argument that the Constitution
prohibits a state jury "from using punitive damages to punish a defendant
for harm to nonparties."99
The United States Supreme Court reversed. It held that "the Constitu-
tion's Due Process Clause forbids a State to use a punitive damages award
to punish a defendant for injury that it inflicts upon nonparties or those
whom they directly represent, i.e., injury that it inflicts upon those who are,
essentially, strangers to the litigation."'100 The Court attempted to draw a line
between allowing evidence of the defendant's similar conduct to nonparties
to show the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct to the plaintiff, on
the one hand, and allowing that same evidence to serve as the basis of the
punitive damages award, on the other. The Court stated that
[e]vidence of actual harm to nonparties can help to show that the conduct
that harmed the plaintiff also posed a substantial risk of harm to the gen-
eral public, and so was particularly reprehensible .... [Yet] a jury may
not go further than this and use a punitive damages verdict to punish a
defendant directly on account of harms it is alleged to have visited on
nonparties.'
0'
The Court's holding in Philip Morris is significant because it further
underscores the Court's understanding of punitive damages as a quasi-
compensatory, individualized form of damages. As Justice Stevens ex-
plained in dissent, "[t]o award compensatory damages to remedy such third-
party harm might well constitute a taking of property from the defendant
without due process. But a punitive damages award, instead of serving a
compensatory purpose, serves the entirely different purposes of retribution
and deterrence that underlie every criminal sanction."'' 0 2 In holding that due
process forbade an award of punitive damages that punishes the defendant
for any conduct besides the conduct that harmed the plaintiff before the
Court, the Court in Philip Morris drove the final nail in the coffin of the
notion that punitive damages could ever be a collective remedy. As we will
see in the next section, however, several courts have clung to the notion of
punitive damages as a collective remedy.
98. Id. (quoting Williams v. Phillip Morris Inc., 127 P.3d 1165, 1175 (Or. 2006)).
99. Id. at 1602.
100. Id. at 1063.
101. Id. at 1064.
102. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1066.
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III. DEVELOPING CASELAW ON CLASSWIDE PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Part III of this article considers the developing caselaw on classwide
punitive damages. This part first examines cases allowing classwide puni-
tive damages and then considers cases rejecting classwide punitive damages.
A. Cases Allowing Classwide Punitive Damages
Since 2003, at least three federal courts have certified classes seeking
punitive, but not compensatory, damages under Title VII. This section criti-
cally examines these three cases and the courts' rationales for certification,
with emphasis on the courts' treatment of due process concerns.
1. Palmer v. Combined Insurance Company of America
Palmer v. Combined Insurance Co. ofAmerica10 3 appears to be the first
reported case involving certification of a class under Title VII in which the
plaintiffs sought punitive damages but not compensatory damages."°4 Pal-
mer involved a group of female employees who sued Combined Insurance
Company ("Combined") for sex discrimination and sexual harassment. 10 5
The plaintiffs alleged that Combined discriminated against its female em-
ployees by providing them with inferior training and sales opportunities and
fewer promotions than their male counterparts and by taking no steps to stop
discrimination and sexual harassment in the workplace."0
Combined sold various insurance products through door-to-door sales
agents throughout the United States.10 7 The company did not maintain offic-
es for its sales agents.'0 8 Employees worked on their own, meeting with
clients in their homes or at restaurants and other public places."° Com-
bined's organizational structure involved twelve sales territories, subdivided
into regions, sub-regions, districts, and territories, with managers at each
103. 217 F.R.D. 430 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
104. Addressing the issue of whether a class seeking punitive and injunctive relief, but
not compensatory damages, could be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) or 23(b)(3), the court
noted that its review of federal case law identified no other Title VII class action proceeding
in this manner. Id. at 438.




109. Palmer, 217 F.R.D. at 433.
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level of the hierarchy."' The court in Palmer did not specify the size of the
plaintiff class except to say that it was "in the thousands."''.
The court initially considered whether the plaintiffs could pursue puni-
tive damages in the absence of compensatory damages. 12 Combined argued
that the plaintiffs could not because "an award of punitive damages must
bear a reasonable relationship to a compensatory damages award, so taking
compensatory damages out of the equation precludes recovery of punitive
damages.""' 3 The court concluded, however, that "nothing in the plain lan-
guage of 42 U.S.C. § 1981a conditions an award of punitive damages on an
underlying award of compensatory damages."
'"14
Having decided that the absence of a claim for compensatory damages
was not, in and of itself, fatal to the plaintiffs' punitive damages claim, the
court turned to the issue of whether an individualized assessment of each
plaintiff's harm would be necessary." 5 The court cited Allison v. Citgo Pe-
troleum Corp."6 for the proposition that "punitive damages may be awarded
on a class-wide basis without individualized proof of injury, 'where the en-
tire class or subclass is subjected to the same discriminatory act or series of
acts."""' The court conceded, however, that "each class member has suf-
fered differing degrees of harm and thus, it appears that distribution of puni-
tive damages will inevitably require individualized assessments.""' 8
Interestingly, the court then contradicted itself, musing that an award of
punitive damages might be awarded pro rata, "allocated by some other for-
mula, to be determined at a later time," or "awarded cy press to an appropri-
ate organization."' The court finally avoided the issue altogether, stating,
"[e]xactly how an award of punitive damages might be distributed need not
be decided at this stage-as long as there are viable options that can ade-
quately address manageability concerns, that is enough for class certifica-
tion."'
20
The court then determined that the proposed class could be certified
under Rule 23(b)(2) but treated "as if it were certified under 23(b)(3)" by
110. Id.
111. See id. at 440 (noting that approximately twenty women had filed individual claims
against Combined and, "while [twenty] would be a significant number if the class being




115. Palmer, 217 F.3d at 438.
116. 151 F.3d402 (5thCir. 1998).
117. Palmer, 217 F.R.D. at 438 (quoting Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402,
417 (5th Cir. 1998)).




giving the class members "notice and opportunity to opt out under Rule
23(d)(2)'s authority."'' The opportunity to opt out, the court stated, would
"ensur[e] constitutionality and adequate due process."'122 Although the court
did not expressly state that this provision would protect the plaintiffs' due
process rights by allowing individual plaintiffs to pursue adequate relief for
individual harms that might not be fully addressed in a class action, the right
to opt out targets this issue.22 The court, however, did not address the poten-
tial violations of the defendant's due process rights that might arise in this
situation, such as the risk of duplicative punishment caused by a class award
followed by individual awards punishing the same conduct.
The court in Palmer recognized that certification of a class for mone-
tary damages in an employment discrimination suit is inappropriate in most
cases, 124 but it repeatedly emphasized that it considered this case "unique" or
a "rare exception" to the rule. 125 The court never explained, however, exactly
how this case was unique in comparison with other Title VII sex discrimina-
tion cases. Certainly the plaintiffs' claims that Combined failed to offer
them opportunities for advancement and looked the other way when female
employees were subjected to sexual harassment are not unusual. The court
did note that the structure of Combined was unusual in that it did not have
121. Id. at 439-40. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(d)(2) provides that "[a]n order
under Rule 23(d)(1) may be altered or amended from time to time .... FED. R. Civ. P.
23(d)(2). Rule 23(d)(1) provides as follows:
In conducting an action under this rule, the court may issue orders that: (A) de-
termine the course of proceedings or prescribe measures to prevent undue repeti-
tion or complication in presenting evidence or argument; (B) require[-]to pro-
tect class members and fairly conduct the action[-]giving appropriate notice to
some or all class members of: (i) any step in the action; (ii) the proposed extent
of the judgment; or (iii) the members' opportunity to signify whether they con-
sider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or de-
fenses, or to otherwise come into the action; (C) impose conditions on the repre-
sentative parties or on intervenors; (D) require that the pleadings be amended to
eliminate allegations about representation of absent persons and that the action
proceed accordingly; or (E) deal with similar procedural matters.
FED. R. Crv. P. 23(d)(1).
Although this rule expressly grants courts the authority to issue orders requiring that no-
tice be given class members, it does not expressly state that courts may issue orders granting
class members the opportunity to opt out. Nevertheless, some federal courts have held that
members of a class certified under Rule 23(b)(2) may be given the opportunity to opt out.
See, e.g., Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int'l Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Wil-
liams v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 832 F.2d 100, 103 (7th Cir. 1987).
122. Palmer, 217 F.R.D. at 440.
123. See Jefferson for the proposition that due process considerations, among other fac-
tors, require that class members in actions for money damages be given personal notice and
an opportunity to opt out. Jefferson, 195 F.3d 894, 897 (citing Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527
U.S. 815 (1999)).
124. Palmer, 217 F.R.D. at 441.
125. Id. at 439-41.
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"actual facilities or other organizational structures," and the plaintiffs argued
that this was "precisely one of the key reasons why the alleged discriminato-
ry practices and policies are able to flourish and remain consistent."'' 26 No
explanation was offered, however, as to how Combined's lack of office fa-
cilities more effectively contributed to a corporate culture of sex discrimina-
tion than would traditional office structures, or how this circumstance would
render a class action for monetary damages more appropriate in this case
than in other employment discrimination cases. Ultimately, the court's ra-
tionale for certifying this class for punitive damages under Rule 23(b)(2) is
unclear.
2. Anderson v. Boeing Company
The plaintiffs in Anderson v. Boeing Co. 127 alleged that Boeing engaged
in a pattern or practice of discrimination against female employees at its
Oklahoma facilities, resulting in these women being paid less than men for
the same work and being assigned less overtime. 128 The plaintiffs sought
injunctive and equitable relief, backpay, and punitive damages'29 for a pro-
posed class of over four hundred female employees. 1
30
Boeing argued against certification of the class for punitive damages on
the ground that determination of punitive damages requires an individua-
lized inquiry into the circumstances of each class member.' 3 ' Rejecting this
argument, the court cited BMW of North America Inc. v. Gore132 for the
proposition that "the major focus in the punitive damages inquiry is 'the
degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct."",133 Thus, the court
stated as follows:
[A] class claim for punitive damages is consistent with the notion that
the focus of a (b)(2) action is the defendant's conduct toward persons
sharing a common characteristic. Because the purpose of punitive dam-
ages is not to compensate the victim, . . . [the inquiry] hinges, not on
facts unique to each class member, but on the defendant's conduct to-
ward the class as a whole. 1
34
126. Id. at438-39.
127. 222 F.R.D. 521 (N.D. Okla. 2004).




132. 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996).
133. Anderson, 222 F.R.D. at 541.
134. Id. (quoting Barefield v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., No. C86-2427 TEH, 1988 WL
188433 at *3, aff'd, No. 97-15451, 1998 WL 482961).
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The court in Anderson then certified the class claims for punitive dam-
ages pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) with no further analysis of the issue of indi-
vidualized assessment of plaintiffs' alleged injuries and no mention of due
process concerns. "'
The court's assertion-that the inquiry necessary to determine an
award of punitive damages hinges on conduct toward the class as a whole
rather than conduct toward individual members-has tremendous rational
appeal but ignores the disconnect between an inquiry into the defendant's
conduct and a determination of the amount of actual harm suffered as a re-
sult of such conduct. Under the logic of BMW and State Farm, the extent of
the potential liability for punitive damages is not known until there is an
evaluation of individual harm. For example, class members who had no de-
sire to work overtime might have suffered no harm from the defendant's
alleged practice of assigning overtime to male employees, even assuming
that the defendant would have denied the plaintiffs the opportunity to work
overtime had they requested it. Because the Supreme Court has made clear
that an award of punitive damages must bear a relationship to plaintiffs'
actual harm as well as to the defendant's conduct, the Anderson court's faul-
ty analysis of this issue lends no support to the proposition that a Title VII
class seeking punitive damages may be certified without running afoul of
the constitutional requirement of due process.
3. Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc.
The most recent, and probably the best-known, Title VII case involving
certification of a class seeking punitive but not compensatory damages is
Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc. 136 In that case, a group of female employees of
Wal-Mart brought suit alleging sex discrimination in terms of both pay and
promotions. 37 In addition to punitive damages, the plaintiffs sought the
equitable remedies of class-wide injunctive and declaratory relief and lost
pay.
138
The plaintiff class included "[a]ll women employed at any Wal-Mart
domestic retail store at any time since December 26, 1998, who have been
or may be subjected to Wal-Mart's challenged pay and management track
promotions policies and practices."'139 The class thus encompassed approx-
imately 1.5 million women in a wide range of positions-from part-time,
entry-level, hourly employees to salaried managers-who were working or
had worked in one or more of Wal-Mart's 3400 stores in forty-one regions
135. Id. at 542.
136. 474 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2007).
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at any time since 1998.140 The Ninth Circuit noted that this was the largest
certified class in history, but concluded that the class, "although large, was
not unmanageable.' 4 '
The court acknowledged that Title VII class actions challenging a "pat-
tern or practice" of discrimination usually proceed in two stages, with the
second stage consisting of a remedy stage in which the district court con-
ducts individualized hearings to determine the scope of individual relief.
142
The Ninth Circuit concluded that individualized hearings were not required,
however, instead approving the district court's plan to employ a formula to
determine the amount of backpay and punitive damages owed to the class
members if Wal-Mart was to be found liable for discrimination.'43 Under
this plan, the jury would decide upon a lump sum of damages, and a special
master would then decide on a formula to allocate the money among the
plaintiffs.1" The Ninth Circuit found that statistical formulas can be accurate
methods for determining class members' remedies.'45 Moreover, the court
stated, "[T]he allocation of relief need not be perfect; ... 'unrealistic exacti-
tude is not required and all doubts should be resolved against the discrimi-
nating employer.'",41
Wal-Mart disputed the constitutionality of this plan on grounds of due
process. 47 Citing State Farm, Wal-Mart argued that awarding punitive dam-
ages without conducting individualized hearings would violate its due
process rights because it might award damages to non-victims. 48 The court
conceded that Wal-Mart was "understandably concerned" about this issue,
49
but distinguished State Farm on the ground that it involved an action
brought on behalf of one individual plaintiff.50 The court offered no expla-
nation, however, as to how the presence of multiple plaintiffs would negate
the Supreme Court's mandate in State Farm and Williams that an award of
punitive damages must bear a direct relationship to the actual harm suffered
by a plaintiff.
The court then upheld the constitutionality of the district court's plan,
stating:
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1237-38.
142. Dukes, 474 F.3d at 1238 (citing Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 361 (1977)).
143. Id. at 1238-40.
144. Id. at 1248 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 1239-40.
146. Id. at 1240 (quoting Shipes v. Trinity Indus., 987 F.2d 311, 317 (5th Cir. 1993)).
147. Id. at 1241-42.
148. Dukes, 474 F.3d at 1242.
149. Id. at 1239.
150. Id. at 1242.
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[I]n its order, the district court imposed several due process protections
to prevent unjust enrichment by non-injured plaintiffs. First, the order
specifies that any punitive damages award will be "based solely on evi-
dence of conduct that was directed toward the class." This ensures that
the punitive damages award will be calibrated to the specific harm suf-
fered by the plaintiff class. In addition, the order states that recovery of
punitive damages will be limited "to those class members who actually
recover an award of lost pay, and thus can demonstrate that they were in
fact personally harmed by the defendant's conduct." Finally, the order
requires that allocations of punitive damages to individual class members
must be "in reasonable proportion to individual lost pay awards." Thus,
in the event that Wal-Mart faces a punitive damages award, the district
court took-and presumably will continue to take-sufficient steps to
ensure that any award will comply with due process. 151
Although the Ninth Circuit rejected Wal-Mart's assertion that an indi-
vidualized assessment of harm was necessary to protect its rights, it upheld
the district court's order granting the plaintiffs the right to opt out as to
claims for punitive damages.'52 Although the Ninth Circuit, like the court in
Palmer, did not explicitly state that the right to opt out would protect the
plaintiffs' due process rights by allowing them to pursue punitive damages
through individual proceedings, the right to opt out clearly has this bene-
fit. 153 In other words, the Ninth Circuit implicitly determined that an oppor-
tunity for individualized assessment of harm was necessary to protect the
plaintiffs' due process rights, but not Wal-Mart's.
Judge Kleinfeld dissented on the ground that certification of the class
deprived Wal-Mart of due process of law, specifically asserting that "[t]he
punitive damages claim poses a constitutional barrier to class certifica-
tion." '154 Criticizing the district court's plan to allocate damages according to
a formula, Judge Kleinfeld stated:
The district court devised a scheme under which an "expert or special
master" using an unspecified formula will allocate back and front pay to
the class members .... But before the "expert or special master" allo-
cates pay, the jury will decide upon a lump sum amount of punitive
damages. The special master will then decide on a formula to divide up
all the money. There will never be an adjudication, by the jury or the
special master, of whether any individual woman was injured by sex dis-
crimination. 155
151. Id. at 1242 (citation omitted).
152. Id. at 1236.
153. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
154. Dukes, 474 F.3d at 1248 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 1248 (internal citations omitted).
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Judge Kleinfeld argued that this scheme cannot satisfy the constitution-
al requirement of due process for two reasons. First, he asserted, that there
will never be an adjudication of compensatory damages.'56 "The Civil
Rights Act expressly prohibits orders requiring the reinstatement, promo-
tion, or payment of back pay to anyone injured 'for any reason other than
discrimination."",157 According to Judge Kleinfeld, "[t]he district court's
class certification scheme requires what the Civil Rights Act prohibits." '
Although reinstatement, promotion, and back pay are actually forms of
equitable relief rather than compensatory damages, Judge Kleinfeld's criti-
cism is well-taken. The majority pointed out that recovery of punitive dam-
ages would be limited to "class members who actually recover an award of
lost pay" and must be in "reasonable proportion" to the lost pay awards, but
it failed to address the threshold issue of whether each class member suf-
fered her loss of pay because of sex discrimination. In Judge Kleinfeld's
words, "Women who were fired or not promoted for good reasons will take
money from Wal-Mart they do not deserve, and get reinstated or promoted
as well. This is 'rough justice' indeed. 'Rough,' anyway.'
159
Second, Judge Kleinfeld asserted that the district court's plan fell short
of the constitutional requirement of due process because:
the allocation of back and front pay will follow the jury determination of
punitive damages. As the Supreme Court held in State Farm, "few
awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory
damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process." "Thus, puni-
tive damages must be determined after proof of liability to individual
plaintiffs at the second stage of a pattern or practice case, not upon the
mere finding of general liability to the class at the first stage.'
160
Judge Kleinfeld also expressed concern for the rights of any injured
plaintiffs, asserting that "[t]he district court's formula approach to dividing
up punitive damages and back pay means that women injured by sex dis-
crimination will have to share any recovery with women who were not."'
6'
Although this concern was likely valid with respect to any damages allo-
cated for lost wages, the district court's order contained a provision allowing
individual plaintiffs to opt out of claims for punitive damages. The plain-
tiffs' due process rights were thus preserved with respect to any claims for
punitive damages.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1248-49 (quoting 42 U.S. C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(A)).
158. Id. at 1249.
159. Id.
160. Dukes, 474 F.3d at 1248 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (emphasis added and internal
citations omitted).
161. Id. at 1249.
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Interestingly, however, neither the majority nor the dissent addressed
the possibility that allowing plaintiffs to participate in the action to seek
equitable relief while opting out as to punitive damages may expose Wal-
Mart to duplicative punishment. According to the district court's plan, a jury
will decide upon a lump sum of punitive damages, but the court's opinion in
this case offered no explanation as to whether this sum-will be determined
based on consideration of harm to the class as a whole, or whether some
procedure will be followed to exclude the harm caused to any plaintiffs who
opt out. If, in determining the lump sum of punitive damages, the jury is
allowed to consider the harm caused to plaintiffs who seek equitable relief
in the class action but opt out as to claims for punitive damages, Wal-Mart
could be repetitively punished for the same conduct in subsequent actions
for punitive damages brought by individual plaintiffs who opted out.
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Dukes focuses on the due process rights
of the class plaintiffs to the exclusion of the defendant. This plan compro-
mised Wal-Mart's due process rights in two respects. First, if Wal-Mart is
found liable for discriminatory policies and procedures, it will be denied an
opportunity to defend itself in individualized hearings as to its conduct to-
ward individual plaintiffs, leaving open the possibility that it will be forced
to compensate individual plaintiffs who were not actually harmed. Second,
by allowing plaintiffs to opt out as to claims for punitive damages, Wal-
Mart may be subjected to duplicative punishment if it is required to pay an
award to the class for its alleged misconduct and awards to individual plain-
tiffs for conduct that was previously considered in the class award.
B. Cases Rejecting Classwide Punitive Damages
As was discussed above, the Fifth Circuit in Allison laid the ground-
work for the rejection of class-wide claims for punitive damages. Although
most courts when faced with plaintiffs seeking both compensatory and puni-
tive damages have denied certification, of the cases in which plaintiffs have
sought punitive damages to the exclusion of compensatory damages, only
two district courts have rejected certifying the punitive damages claim.
1. Carlson v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc.
The plaintiffs in Carlson v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc.'62 filed suit
against C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. (CHR), a transportation logistics
company with 134 branch offices in over forty-two states. The plaintiffs
sought back pay, front pay, nominal damages, and punitive damages.'63
162. No. 02-3780, 2005 WL 758602 (D. Minn. Mar. 31, 2005).
163. Id.at*15.
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They alleged, among other things, that CHR had discriminated against fe-
male employees in pay and promotion and sought to certify pay and promo-
tion classes consisting of "all females who have been employed on a full-
time bases by [CHR] in a domestic branch office."'" For the pay class, the
court found that the plaintiffs' allegations of a centralized group of male
vice presidents who dictated compensation based on the subjective recom-
mendations of the branch managers met the Rule 23(a) requirements.'65 As
for the promotions class, the court found Rule 23(a) satisfied because the
plaintiffs supported their allegation that CHR failed to promote women pro-
portionally to their workforce numbers as a result of an all-male, centralized,
subjective decision-making process and a "tap on the shoulder" promotions
policy."6
Turning to the requirements of Rule 23(b), however, the court was
concerned with the effect of the plaintiffs' request for punitive damages on
the classes' certifiability under (b)(2).'67 The court thought that the individu-
alized inquiries required for punitive damages threatened to "overwhelm the
litigation."'68 The plaintiffs argued, based on Palmer v. Combined Insurance
Co., that the court could distribute punitive damages formulaically and the-
reby dispense with the need for individualized determinations. But the dis-
trict court in Carlson rejected that argument, stating that "a blanket award of
punitive damages not premised on individualized harm is [not] appropri-
ate.' 69 To support that holding, the court cited State Farm: "A defendant
164. Id. at *6-7. The subclass for promotions limited the class to those female employees
who "had more than two years' experience in a sales and/or operations position at any time
during the liability period." Id. at *7.
165. Id. at *8.
166. Id.at*10.
167. Id. at *16. The court also worried about the effect of the request for lost wages and
nominal damages, but it should not have. The ability to bring a claim for lost wages in a
(b)(2) class has been "entrenched as a matter of precedent." Piar, supra note 7, at 319. Be-
cause lost wages is an equitable, rather than legal, remedy, the same due process concerns
attendant with compensatory and punitive damages are not present with lost wages. See Jef-
ferson v. Ingersoll Int'l Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 896 (7th Cir. 1999); see generally Samuel Issa-
charoff, Preclusion, Due Process, and the Right to Opt Out of Class Actions, 77 NoTRE
DAME L. REv. 1057 (2002) (drawing the distinction between equitable remedies and tradi-
tional common law compensatory remedies as far as the effect on due process of the aggrega-
tion of those respective remedies). As for nominal damages, they certainly bring to mind
Allison's narrow exception for statutorily-determined damages to its bright-line rule forbid-
ding the certification of claims for compensatory damages. See Allison v. Citgo Petroleum
Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 415 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Arnold v. United Artists Theatre Circuit,
Inc., 158 F.R.D. 439 (N.D. Cal. 1994), a case in which the defendant's liability entitled the
class to a statutorily mandated damages award, as an instance where a claim for compensato-
ry damages could be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) as incidental to the injunctive and declara-
tory relief sought).
168. Carlson, 2005 WL 758602, at *16.
169. Id.
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should be punished for the conduct that harmed the individual plaintiff, not
for being an unsavory individual or business."'' 70 The court distinguished
Palmer on the basis that the court in Palmer had found "a unique set of cir-
cumstances," not present in Carlson, "where a blanket award of punitive
damages based on the defendant's conduct might be appropriate.'' The
court removed the problem punitive damages posed to certification by se-
vering them pursuant to Rule 23(c)(4)(A) 172 and certifying the pay and pro-
motion classes on the issues of liability and the request for declaratory or
injunctive relief only. 1
73
2. Nelson v. Wal-Mart Stores
The discussion on the issue of punitive damages and the due-process
implications for Title VII class actions in Nelson v. Wal-Mart Stores174 is by
far the most thorough to date. Nelson involved a challenge to Wal-Mart's
hiring practices for its workforce of over-the-road truck drivers. Wal-Mart's
transportation division employed approximately 8000 drivers in forty-seven
field transportation offices nationwide. 17 The plaintiffs alleged that Wal-
Mart engaged in a pattern-and-practice of discrimination against African
American drivers through hiring policies promulgated by Wal-Mart's corpo-
rate offices in Bentonville, that placed new driver recruitment in the hands
of its current driver workforce, which was predominately white.'7 6 Such
policies included word-of-mouth recruitment, interview screening commit-
tees consisting of current drivers, and allowing the final hiring decision to be
unconstrained and subjective.' The plaintiff sought to certify a class in-
cluding (1) all African American applicants who met Wal-Mart's minimum
requirements and were not hired and (2) all African American over-the-road
truck drivers who met Wal-Mart's minimum requirements but were deterred
from applying.7 7 Like the court in Carlson, the district court in Nelson had
little trouble concluding that the Rule 23(a) prerequisites were met.'79 When
it came to Rule 23(b), however, the court believed that certification was
stymied by the presence of a claim for punitive damages.
170. Id. (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 423 (2003)).
171. Id. The court in Carlson also cited Anderson v. Boeing Co., 224 F.R.D. 521 (N.D.
Okla. 2004), but only to show the existence of a contrary precedent.
172. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(4)(A) provides that "an action may be brought
or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(A).
173. Carlson, 2005 WL 758602 at *16.
174. 245 F.R.D. 358 (E.D. Ark. 2007).
175. Id. at 362.
176. Id. at 363.
177. Id. at 363-64.
178. Id. at 365.
179. See id. at 367.
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The court began by discussing the nature of a Rule 23(b)(2) class. Be-
cause a (b)(2) class is mandatory and assumes homogeneity of interest
among the class members, the court noted that due-process concerns are
raised when plaintiffs attempt to aggregate individual damages claims into a
(b)(2) class because a class member might find his favorable damages claim
compromised or, conversely, recover more than that to which he is en-
titled. ° The district court in Nelson, following Allison, framed the central
inquiry for due process purposes as whether the plaintiffs' request for puni-
tive damages was a group remedy and therefore capable of being certified
without any risk of violating the individual class members' rights to due
process, or an individual-by-individual remedy, for which certification
would be inappropriate. 8'
The plaintiffs asserted that their claim for punitive damages was a
group rather than an individual-by-individual remedy and could therefore be
awarded on a classwide basis without individualized proof of injury. They
argued that the focus on punitive damages was on the egregiousness of the
defendant's conduct, and not on the injury to each class member." 2 They
further argued that, because they alleged each class member was affected by
Wal-Mart's hiring practices and policies in a similar way, they satisfied the
dicta in Allison suggesting that punitive damages could be a classwide re-
medy if each class member "was affected by [the defendant's] policies and
practices in a similar way.'
183
The court noted that the plaintiffs' arguments were not without appeal,
especially in a pattern-and-practice case. 8 When a fact finder finds that an
employer has engaged in a pattern and practice of discrimination with re-
spect to a specific employment practice, that fact finder has found, in es-
sence, that the employer's employment practice cannot be explained by any-
thing else but discrimination against a class, irrespective of any individua-
lized findings regarding discrimination specific to any class member.'85
Thus, there is an intuitive sense that the defendant ought to be punished at
the stage when it is found that they engaged in a pattern-and-practice of dis-
crimination without the need to make any individualized findings of dis-
crimination. 86 And, where the act of discrimination is the same to each in-
dividual class member and the size of the class can be determined without
resort to individual hearings, punitive damages could be thought of as flow-
ing to the class as a whole immediately upon a finding of liability at the pat-
180. Nelson, 245 F.R.D. at 367-68.
181. Id. at 374.
182. Id. at 376.
183. Id. at 377.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See Nelson, 245 F.R.D. at 388.
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tern-and-practice stage.187 Such would be the case with, for example, a class
of plaintiffs who alleged that they were discriminated against, in that the
defendant's practices prevented them from even hearing about a job oppor-
tunity.
Nevertheless, the court in Nelson still rejected the argument that the
plaintiffs' proposed class could be certified with their request for punitive
damages. The court essentially applied the reasoning of State Farm to de-
termine that individualized proceedings would be needed before punitive
damages could be assessed in a manner consonant with Wal-Mart's due
process rights.'88 The court stated:
[A] jury would not be able to determine the extent of the harm caused by
Wal-Mart's conduct, and as a corollary the extent of the need for pu-
nishment and deterrence, at the classwide stage without engaging in fur-
ther individualized determinations .... Typically, a court or jury is not
able to determine, until the conclusion of the second stage of a Team-
sters-style proceeding, which alleged class members were actually
harmed by the defendant's pattern of discriminatory acts and which were
not. Thus, unless each alleged class member has actually suffered harm
from the pattern of illegal acts-which is highly unlikely-Wal-Mart
would be over-deterred by any classwide award of punitive damages. In-
dividualized determinations are necessary to fully realize the extent of
the harm caused by Wal-Mart's conduct and properly assess the need for
punishment and deterrence. Such individualized determinations in this
case would include whether each proposed class member met Wal-
Mart's minimum requirements at the time he or she applied for a posi-
tion as an over-the-road truck driver or was deterred from applying ..
[and] whether Wal-Mart denied employment to an individual applicant
who met the minimum requirements for lawful reasons.' 
89
Because a determination of the total harm was a prerequisite, according
to BMW and State Farm, to the proper assessment of punitive damages, and
because the total harm would not be known until after individualized deter-
minations were made, the court in Nelson determined that the plaintiffs'
request for punitive damages was non-incidental.' 9 Because the punitive
damages were non-incidental, there was a serious risk that, due to the man-
datory nature of the (b)(2) class, some class members would have their
claims for punitive damages compromised or, worse, would be able to re-
cover without having suffered any injury.'9'
187. See id.
188. See id. at 377-78.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 377.
191. Id. at 377-78.
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The plaintiffs suggested that those due process problems could be
avoided by allowing class members to opt out of the (b)(2) class. The court
opined that an opt-out class would arguably relieve any due process con-
cerns, but circuit-court precedent foreclosed such an option. 192 The court did
not mention the other due-process problem of duplicative punishment if
class members were allowed to opt out. The court concluded by adopting the
solution used by the district court in Carlson: severing the claim for punitive
damages under Rule 23(c)(4)(A) and certifying a class as to liability and
declaratory and equitable relief. 93
IV. DARNED IF YOU Do, DARNED IF You DON'T
The crux of the problem is that the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on
due process as applied to punitive damages awards has left Title VII class-
action plaintiffs no way to have a class claim for punitive damages certified
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) that is consistent with the
due process rights of both the plaintiffs and the defendants. As discussed
above, certification of a mandatory class under Rule 23(b)(2), that is one
that class members cannot opt out of, has historically been the most com-
mon means of pursuing class actions for Title VII plaintiffs because class
certification pursuant to other sections of Rule 23(b) is generally inappro-
priate in employment discrimination actions. The addition of compensatory
and punitive damages to Title VII plaintiffs' arsenal of remedies, however,
altered the balance because these damages hinge on the actual harm that the
plaintiffs suffered, which often requires an individualized assessment to
quantify. If a class claim for punitive damages cannot be certified under
Rule 23(b), Title VII plaintiffs may be left with no avenue at all through
which to pursue a class claim for punitive damages.
Of course, determination of back pay, deemed an equitable remedy, al-
so generally requires some type of individualized determination of each
class member's entitlement to relief. However, such a determination has no
adverse due process effects for either defendants or plaintiffs. Because back
pay is an equitable remedy, some "rough justice" in distribution of the
award-such as the use of a formula to allocate back pay among the class
members-is permissible. As for a defendant employer, the entire amount of
back pay for which the defendant will be liable is immediately determinable
upon the finding of liability to the class. In a hiring case, for instance, if the
defendant is found liable for a pattern or practice of discrimination, then the
defendant will owe back pay determined by the number of positions open
during the class period (which is usually determined by the statute of limita-
192. Nelson, 245 F.R.D. at 377-78.
193. Id. at 380.
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tions). That calculation can be made without reference to the individual cir-
cumstances of any of the class members. Any individualized inquiry neces-
sary to allocate equitable relief follows the determination of the defendant's
liability for the lump sum, hence the two-stage procedure typically used in
pattern-and-practice discrimination cases. As far as the defendant is con-
cerned, though, the procedure ends with the determination of the lump
sum-that is the actual harm.
Although a finding of liability for discrimination against the class as a
whole would also necessarily precede an award of punitive damages, as-
sessment of the amount of punitive damages owed to a class as a whole
must follow individualized inquiry into the actual harm suffered because the
Supreme Court has held that an award of punitive damages must bear a di-
rect relationship to actual harm. Thus, the proceeding would not end with
individualized inquiry into actual harm. After a jury had determined the
issue of liability, it would need a determination as to each class member's
actual harm before it could determine a punitive damages award owed to the
class as a whole. The requirement of individualized assessment of harm in
the middle of the proceedings would render the conduct of the litigation as a
class action unworkable in most cases.
As discussed above, 94 the three federal courts that have thus far certi-
fied class claims for punitive damages under 23(b)(2) have failed to recog-
nize that such assessments are necessary to determine a punitive damages
award. The court in Palmer admitted that individualized assessment would
be necessary to determine the "distribution of punitive damages," but con-
cluded that issues attendant to distribution need not be addressed prior to
class certification.'95 In Dukes, the Ninth Circuit stated that individualized
assessment was not required because use of a statistical formula would pro-
vide an adequate means of allocating a punitive damages award to class
members.'96 Both courts thus avoided the problem of individualized assess-
ment by framing the issue in terms of proper distribution of a punitive dam-
ages award rather than proper determination of the amount of harm justify-
ing such an award in the first instance. By ducking the ultimate issue, courts
are being intellectually dishonest. Defendants, of course, do not care about
the distribution of punitive damages among the class members. Rather, they
want to make sure their liability for punitive damages is minimized. When
the amount of harm is yet-to-be-determined, defendants are not in a position
to argue about what amount of punitive damages is constitutionally permiss-
ible under due process.
194. See supra Part III.A.
195. Palmer v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 217 F.R.D. 430, 439 (N.D. I11. 2003).
196. Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 474 F.3d 1214, 1239-40 (9th Cir. 2007).
[Vol. 30
2008] DUE PROCESS, PUNITIVE DAMAGES, & TITLE VII 487
Even if a court could solve the problems associated with the need to
provide an individualized assessment of each class member's actual harm,
however, one problem remains that is seemingly insurmountable in most
cases: whether to certify the class as a mandatory class or an opt-out class.
An opt-out class protects plaintiffs' due process rights by allowing individu-
al class members to pursue claims for punitive damages in situations in
which their claims might not be adequately addressed in the class action
context, but, as noted above, this solution subjects defendants to the risk of
duplicative punishment for the same conduct. The Supreme Court has estab-
lished that repetitive punishment would violate the defendant's right to due
process. A mandatory class, on the other hand, presents the opposite dilem-
ma. The mandatory nature of the class would prevent individual awards of
punitive damages based on the same conduct already punished through a
punitive damages award to the class-thus addressing the risk of repeatedly
punishing the defendant-but might deny some plaintiffs the opportunity to
show that the defendant's conduct toward them was especially egregious
and that they are therefore entitled to a larger award than that allocated to
other members of the class.197 In other words, courts are generally darned if
they allow plaintiffs to opt out and darned if they don't-either way, some-
one's due process rights are compromised.
Of course, given the fact that courts must ultimately choose between
certifying a class as to claims for punitive damages, whether as a mandatory
class or not, or refusing to certify the class, courts are understandably reluc-
tant to refuse to certify the class where the defendant is alleged to have en-
gaged in fairly reprehensible conduct. Although plaintiffs may still proceed
on their own if class certification is denied, many of them will not do so.
The courts in Palmer and Dukes were not blind to the existence of due
process concerns, but they seemed to be reaching for a way to enable the
plaintiffs to have their day in court as to their claims for classwide punitive
damages. The court in Nelson, on the other hand, recognized that the plain-
tiffs had produced evidence "at least suggest[ing]" that the defendant rou-
tinely excluded African Americans from hiring opportunities for certain
positions,198 but it determined upon thorough analysis that the plaintiffs did
197. There are limited circumstances in which an opt-out option is not necessary to pro-
tect the plaintiffs' rights. For example, a case involving only plaintiffs who were deterred
from applying for employment because of discriminatory advertising and recruiting policies,
such as the deterred applicants in Nelson, would be an appropriate fit for a mandatory Rule
23(b)(2) class. Each class member in this situation suffers exactly the same harm because of
exactly the same corporate policies and procedures. This type of factual situation is relatively
rare, however, because employment discrimination class actions generally involve numerous
plaintiffs who may have worked in various locations, reported to different supervisors, or
performed different jobs, and thus were subjected to different types or degrees of discrimina-
tory conduct.
198. Nelson, 245 F.R.D. at 370.
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not meet the requirements for certification under either Rule 23(b)(2) or
23(b)(3) with respect to their claims for punitive damages.'99 Thus, one
could also argue that courts are darned if they certify the class and darned if
they don't.
V. CONCLUSION
The due process dilemma faced by Title VII plaintiffs seeking class
certification as to claims for punitive damages appears to be the result of the
law of unintended consequences. In developing its jurisprudence as to the
constitutional requirements of due process in awarding punitive damages,
the Supreme Court showed no intent to thwart the will of Congress to allow
Title VII plaintiffs to pursue class claims for punitive damages. The result,
though somewhat unpalatable, is that probably the overwhelming majority
of Title VII class actions cannot be certified as to claims for punitive dam-
ages without running afoul of the requirements of due process. Although
some courts have certified classes as to such claims over the objections of
defendants, this result can be achieved only through an intellectual compro-
mise-one that also compromises the due process rights of the plaintiffs, the
defendants, or both.
This issue will likely end up before the Supreme Court at some point.
Until a decision of that Court clarifies the limits of due process upon Title
VII class claims for punitive damages, however, plaintiffs and defendants in
such actions must litigate in a minefield where class certification, and the
course of proceedings for any such class actions that are certified, is uncer-
tain at best and arbitrary at worst.
199. Id. at 373-79.
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